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A Calculus of Interest
Canadian Peacekeeping Diplomacy in Cyprus,
1963-1993
G R E G  D O N A G H Y
Abstract: Fifty years ago, Canadian peacekeepers landed on the small 
Mediterranean island of Cyprus, where they stayed for thirty long years. 
This paper uses declassified cabinet papers and diplomatic records to 
tackle three key questions about this mission: why did Canadians ever go 
to distant Cyprus? Why did they stay for so long? And why did they leave 
when they did? The answers situate Canada’s commitment to Cypress 
against the country’s broader postwar project to preserve world order in 
an era marked by the collapse of the European empires and the brutal 
wars in Algeria and Vietnam. It argues that Canada stayed— through 
fifty-nine troop rotations, 29,000 troops, and twenty-eight dead— because 
peacekeeping worked. Admittedly there were critics, including Prime 
Ministers Pearson, Trudeau, and Mulroney, who complained about the 
failure of peacemaking in Cyprus itself. But their frustrations were offset 
by a triumvirate of humanitarian, diplomatic, and partisan justifications 
for soldiering on, and so, Canada stayed until the balance sheet of 
interests shifted in the 1980s.
T h e r e  h a s  o f t e n  been a whiff of wry cynicism associated with Canada’s long, thirty-year role in Cyprus. Early on, rotating 
Canadian commanders greeted new arrivals with an ambiguous line 
from Shakespeare’s Othello: “You are welcome, Sirs, to Cyprus.” 
Departing officers wordlessly handed their reliefs a large sink plug
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a n d  c h a in .1 B u t  th e r e  w a s  l i t t le  t h a t  w a s  g e n u in e ly  ig n o b le  or b a s e  
a b o u t  C a n a d a ’s c o m m itm e n t  to  C y p r u s — a  v e r ita b le  c a s e  s t u d y  o f  
th e  k in d  o f  a c t iv e , re s p o n s ib le , m id d le -p o w e r  d ip lo m a c y  t h a t  d e fin e d  
th e  c o u n t r y ’s fo re ig n  p o lic y  fo r m u c h  o f  th e  m id - tw e n t ie th  c e n tu r y . 
R e s c u in g  C y p r u s  fro m  its  p o s tc o lo n ia l  r u p tu r e  w a s  n o t a  jo b  fo r w h ic h  
C a n a d a  v o lu n te e r e d , th o u g h  it d o v e ta ile d  n e a t ly  w ith  th e  p e r s o n a l 
a n d  fo re ig n  p o lic y  a m b itio n s  o f  its  f irs t  C a n a d ia n  sp o n s o r, S e c r e t a r y  
o f  S t a te  fo r E x t e r n a l  A f f a ir s  P a u l  M a r t in  S r .2 A s  C y p r u s  s e t t le d  
in to  a  fr u s t r a t in g  s ta le m a te  p u n c tu a t e d  b y  m o m e n ts  o f  a c u te  d a n g e r , 
it fit le s s  w e ll w ith  th e  fo re ig n  p o lic y  g o a ls  o f  M a r t in ’s s u c c e s s o r s , 
w h o  d o u b te d  t h a t  p e a c e k e e p in g  w a s  “ a  re lia b le  s o u rc e  o f  in flu e n c e , 
k u d o s , o r e v e n  o f  a n y  g r e a t  s a t is fa c t io n .” 3 T h e ir  fr u s tr a t io n s , h o w ev er , 
w e re  c o n s is te n t ly  o ffse t  b y  a  t r iu m v ir a t e  o f  h u m a n ita r ia n , d ip lo m a tic , 
a n d  p a r t is a n  ju s t if ic a t io n s  for s o ld ie r in g  o n , a n d  so , C a n a d ia n  
p e a c e k e e p e r s  s ta y e d  u n til  th e  b a la n c e  s h e e t o f  in te r e s ts  s h if t e d  in  th e  
la te  19 8 0 s. C a n a d a  in  C y p r u s  is  a  le s s o n  in  d ip lo m a tic  a c c o u n tin g  
a n d  th e  c a lc u lu s  o f  in te re s t.
A s  P r im e  M in is te r  L e s t e r  B . P e a r s o n  a n d  h is  n e w  L ib e r a l  c a b in e t  
h u rr ie d  th r o u g h  O t t a w a ’s c o ld  s p r in g  s u n s h in e  to  b e  s w o r n  in  a s  
C a n a d a ’s n in e te e n th  g o v e r n m e n t  in  A p r i l  19 6 3 , t h e y  k n e w  t h a t  th e  
w o r ld  a b o u t th e m  w a s  r a p id ly  c h a n g in g . A  d e c a d e  e a r lie r , C a n a d ia n  
d ip lo m a c y  w a s  c le a r ly  a t  th e  h e ig h t  o f  its  p o s t w a r  in flu e n c e . B a c k e d  
b y  la rg e  d e fe n ce  a n d  fo re ig n  a id  e x p e n d itu r e s — th e s e  to p p e d  8 p e rc e n t 
o f  g d p  in  1 9 5 3 - 1 9 5 4 — C a n a d a ’s d ip lo m a ts  h a d  b e e n  a m o n g  th e  m a in  
a r c h it e c t s  o f  th e  N o r th  A t la n t ic  T r e a t y  O r g a n iz a t io n  (n a t o ) a n d  th e  
m u lt ir a c ia l  C o m m o n w e a lth .4 T h e y  h a d  p io n e e re d  in te r n a t io n a l a id  
a n d  d e fin e d  th e  n o rm s  a n d  p ro c e d u re s  o f  th e  U n ite d  N a tio n s  (u n ). 
B u t  t h a t  w o r ld  w a s  fa d in g . A s  E u r o p e  a n d  th e  F a r  E a s t  re c o v e re d  
fro m  th e  S e c o n d  W o r ld  W a r , a n d  p o s tc o lo n ia l  A f r ic a  a n d  A s ia  p u s h e d  
to  th e  fo re fro n t, C a n a d a ’s r e la t iv e  s ta n d in g  d e c lin e d , a n d  w ith  it, th e  
s c o p e  fo r m e a n in g fu l d ip lo m a c y . W e s t  G e r m a n y  a n d  F r a n c e  jo s t le d
1 Arthur Andrew, T h e  R is e  a n d  F a l l  o f  a M id d le  P o w e r :  C a n a d ia n  D ip lo m a c y  fr o m  
K in g  to  M u lr o n e y  (Toronto: James Lormier, 1993), 75.
2 On M artin’s foreign policy ambitions, see Greg Donaghy, G r it:  T h e  L i f e  a n d  
P o l i t i c s  o f  P a u l M a r t in  S r . (Vancouver: U B C Press, 2015), 189-197.
3 Andrew, T h e  R is e  a n d  F a ll  o f  a M id d le  P o w e r , 75.
4 David Bercuson, “Canada, NATO, and rearmament, 1950-1954: why Canada 
made a difference (but not for very long),” in John English and Norman Hillmer, 
eds., M a k in g  a D if fe r e n c e :  C a n a d a ’s  F o r e ig n  P o l ic y  in  a C h a n g in g  W o rld  O r d e r  
(Toronto: Lester, 1992), 104-105.
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for a bigger role in n a t o , raising questions about Canada’s place 
in the alliance. Third World nations added race and economics to 
Commonwealth and u n  agendas, pushing aside traditional Canadian 
worries about stability and global governance. The change was 
highlighted in Saturday Night Magazine, the brainy monthly for 
Canada’s liberal elites. Donald Gordon, the former Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation (c b c ) London correspondent turned 
political scientist, fired a shot across Pearson’s bow in October: 
“Warning: Our Halo Abroad is Slipping.”5 Settling in, Pearson and 
Martin cast about for a distinctly Canadian role in world affairs.
The search was conducted over the winter of 1964 in the course of 
the government’s long promised defence policy review. A staunch cold 
warrior, Defence Minister Paul Hellyer favoured Canada’s traditional 
n a t o  role in Western Europe. Canada’s ambitious foreign minister, 
Paul Martin, took a more expansive view. He attacked Hellyer’s grasp 
of recent global developments, and criticised him for emphasizing 
Canada’s n a t o  functions while failing to take into account Europe’s 
renewed capacity to defend itself. Most important, he charged, 
Hellyer overlooked the threat to global order posed by decolonisation, 
ignoring the role Canada was already playing in the Middle East, 
the Congo, and Indochina.6 Pearson agreed, and he summoned 
Martin and Hellyer to his Sussex Drive residence to hash out an 
approach to world affairs that placed a much stronger emphasis on u n  
peacekeeping. By the time they were done, and the White Paper on 
Defence was published in March 1964, the looming conflict between 
Turkey and Greece over Cyprus was already testing the government’s 
faith in u n  peacekeeping.
Cyprus was precisely the kind of threat to global order that Martin 
and his diplomats in the Department of External Affairs feared. A 
former British colony, it had gained its independence in 1960 under 
a complex constitution that was designed to protect the rights of its 
Turkish-Cypriot minority, which represented about 20 percent of the 
island’s 600,000 people, from its larger Greek-Cypriot majority. The 
new state hobbled along for almost three years until its frustrated
5 Donald Gordon, “Warning: Our Halo Abroad is Slipping,” S a tu r d a y  N ig h t, 
October 1963, 23-25.
6 Martin to Hellyer, 21 December 1963, Raymont Papers, File 768, DHIST. The 
debate is treated fully in Greg Donaghy, T o le r a n t A ll ie s :  C a n a d a  a n d  th e  U n ited  
S ta te s , 1 9 6 3 -6 8  (Kingston & Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), 95-97.
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president, the Greek-Cypriot leader Archbishop Makarios, tried to 
amend the constitution unilaterally in late 1963. Turkish-Cypriots 
protested, Greek-Cypriots rioted, and a full-blown crisis erupted. 
When Turkey threatened to intervene to defend Turkish-Cypriots, 
raising the prospect of war with Greece, both n a t o  members, Britain 
boosted its presence and imposed a truce. In the midst of its headlong 
retreat from empire, Britain had no appetite for colonial adventure 
and quickly set out in search of help.
Wary of Makarios’s links with the u n ’s nonaligned members 
and anxious to prevent Moscow from meddling in n a t o ’s eastern 
flank, London favoured a n a t o  force. Through January 1964, Martin 
and his officials followed Anglo-American efforts to pull the force 
together. They were not inclined to be helpful and tried to forestall 
an invitation to join. Canada was engaged in five other u n  missions, 
and Cyprus was a tough nut to crack. Moreover, Canadian diplomats 
declared as loud as they could, the island was a European problem 
and there were European countries “well able” to act.7 But no one 
paid much attention, and late in the afternoon of 31 January, British 
and u s  diplomats arrived at Martin’s office with an aide memoire 
inviting Canada to join a n a t o  peacekeeping force for Cyprus.8
The Anglo-American plan collapsed within days, rejected by 
Makarios, who insisted on linking the force to the u n  Security Council. 
As British and American diplomats flirted with various u n  formulas 
acceptable to Makarios, Greece, and Turkey, the mood in External 
Affairs grew edgy. Arnold Smith, an influential assistant under­
secretary, fretted that the force lacked clear political objectives. He 
suspected the British of scheming to maintain political control while 
shifting the military burden onto others. The mission, he warned, 
would assume imperialist overtones without an unimpeachable link 
with the u n , leaving Canada “out in the cold with the neo-colonialists.”9
Martin shared these concerns and he was irked when his efforts to 
engage London and Washington were ignored. “Both u s  and British 
[sic]” he complained, “are acting without too much prior consultation
7 Arnold Smith, Memorandum for the Minister, 29 January 1964, RG 25, Vol 
10130, File 21-14-1-Cyprus, LAC, and Martin, “At the Right Hand of Power: A 
Record of Canadian Foreign Policy, 1963-1968,” 422, Martin Papers, Vol 463, LAC.
8 Ross Campbell, Memorandum for the Acting Under-Secretary, 1 February 1964, 
RG 25, Vol 10130, File 21-14-1-Cyprus, LAC.
9 G.S. Murray to Smith, 12 February 1964, and Smith to File, 24 February 1964, 
RG 25, Vol 10130, File 21-14-1-Cyprus, LAC.
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w ith  C a n a d a  &  th e  o th e r s .” 10 H e w a s  e v e n  m o re  ir r it a t e d  a  fe w  d a y s  
la te r  w h e n  v is it in g  B r it is h  F o re ig n  S e c r e t a r y  R . A .  B u t le r  ig n o re d  
h is  s ig n a ls  a n d  c h e e r fu lly  to ld  th e  p re ss  t h a t  L o n d o n  c o n fid e n tly  
e x p e c te d  a  th o u s a n d  C a n a d ia n  tr o o p s . M a r t in  ru s h e d  o u t a  d e n ia l 
“ a s  a  w a r n in g  to  U  T h a n t  &  o u r fr ie n d s  t h a t  t h e y  do n o t [sic] t a k e  u s 
fo r g r a n t e d .” 11 N o  d e c is io n  on  C a n a d ia n  p a r t ic ip a t io n  w o u ld  b e  ta k e n , 
P e a r s o n  to ld  th e  H o u se  o f  C o m m o n s  on  19 F e b r u a r y , u n til  O t t a w a  
w a s  h a p p y  w ith  th e  fo rc e ’s c o m p o s it io n  a n d  its  t e r m s  o f  re fe r e n c e .12
A g a in  th e  p r im e  m in is t e r ’s s ta te m e n t  h a d  l i t t le  im p a c t , a n d  
ru m o u r s  c o n tin u e d  t o  s u r fa c e  in  N e w  Y o r k  a n d  L o n d o n  t h a t  C a n a d a  
w a s  a b o u t to  jo in  B r it a in  a lo n e  in  f ie ld in g  a  fo rce . M a r t in  to ld  S m ith  
to  s c o tc h  th e  s to r ie s , in s is t in g  t h a t  C a n a d a  w o u ld  o n ly  jo in  a  u n  
fo rce  w h ic h  in c lu d e d  a t  le a s t  on e o th e r  s ig n if ic a n t  u n  m e m b e r .13 T h e  
m in is te r  w a n t e d  o th e r  is s u e s  a d d r e s s e d  t o o  b e fo re  th e  fo rce  t o o k  fin a l 
s h a p e . H e w a n t e d  a  u n  a d v is o r y  c o m m itte e  to  g iv e  O t t a w a  a  v o ic e  
in  th e  fo rc e ’s p o lit ic a l  p o lic ie s  a s  w e ll a s  a  b r o a d ly -b a s e d  m e d ia to r y  
m e c h a n is m  to  d e v e lo p  a  lo n g -te r m  s o lu tio n  fo r C y p r u s .14 H e  w a s  a lso  
a n x io u s  t o  e n s u re  t h a t  fu n d in g  fo r th e  fo rce  w o u ld  n o t u n d e rm in e  th e  
d is p u te d  p rin c ip le  t h a t  p e a c e k e e p in g  w a s  a  co re  u n  d u ty , w h o s e  c o s ts  
w e re  a  c o lle c t iv e  re s p o n s ib ility .15
N o n e  o f  th e s e  is s u e s  w e re  re s o lv e d  b y  4 M a r c h , w h e n  th e  S e c u r it y  
C o u n c il  p a s s e d  a  re s o lu tio n  c r e a tin g  a  u n  p e a c e k e e p in g  fo rce  for 
C y p r u s .  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  U  T h a n t  q u ic k ly  in v ite d  C a n a d a ,  S w e d e n , 
F in la n d , I r e la n d , a n d  B r a z i l  to  p a r t ic ip a te . A s  h e  is s u e d  h is  in v ita t io n , 
th e  s e c r e ta r y -g e n e r a l  m a d e  it c le a r  t h a t  h e  e x p e c te d  C a n a d a  to  s e r v e , 
a n  a s s u m p tio n  s h a r e d  in  c h a n c e lle r ie s  a n d  e d ito r ia l  o ffic e s  a ro u n d  th e  
w o r ld . M a r t in , w ith  b a c k in g  fro m  P e a r s o n  a n d  th e  c a b in e t , re fu s e d  
to  b e  r u s h e d .16 In  a d d it io n  to  h is  e a r lie r  w o r r ie s  a b o u t  c o n s u lta t io n  
a n d  m e d ia t io n , th e re  w e r e  le g it im a te  q u e s tio n s  to  b e  a s k e d  a b o u t  th e
10 Martin marginal note on Campbell, Memorandum for the Minister, 8 February 
1964, RG  25, Vol 10130, File 21-14-1-Cyprus, LAC.
11 Smith’s marginal note on his Memorandum for the Minister, 18 February 1964, 
RG 25, Vol 10130, File 21-14-1-Cyprus, LAC.
12 Canada, House of Commons, D e b a te s , 6.
13 Smith, Memorandum for File, 24 February 1964, RG 25, Vol 10130, File 
21-14-1-Cyprus, LAC.
14 Ottawa to New York, tel G-22, 25 February 1964, and Ottawa to London, tel 
S-88, 1 March 1964, RG 25, Vol 10130, File 21-14-1-Cyprus, LAC.
15 Cadieux, Memorandum for the Minister, 3 March 1964, and Ottawa to New 
York, tel V-66, 3 March 1964, RG 25, Vol 10137, 21-14-6-UNFICYP-9, LAC.
16 Cabinet Conclusions, 5 March 1964, PC O , LAC.
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force’s duties, financing, and terms of reference. Crucially, would the 
small force of 7,000 be ordered to disarm Greek-Cypriot guerrillas 
totalling almost twice their number?
U Thant, whom Martin liked, was evasive and inconclusive. 
He refused to adopt a consultative mechanism or consider a broad 
u n  mediatory role. Moreover, he declined to answer questions on 
engaging with guerrilla forces, though his advisors indicated that u n  
commanders would not try to disarm Cypriot irregulars.17 Though 
the u n ’s position fell far short of Canadian desiderata, the pressure 
to act was becoming unbearable. Renewed rioting seized Cyprus, as 
Greek-Cypriots surged forward to capture Turkish-Cypriot territory 
in anticipation of a UN-imposed halt. At home, Pearson’s government 
faced an escalating barrage of criticism from the Progressive 
Conservative and New Democratic opposition, who pinned the 
delay on Liberal obstructionism. When Martin reassured them that 
“Canada will not shirk its responsibility,” the press pounced.18 In a 
mocking editorial, entitled “ ’Not Shirking’ duty but...”, the Toronto 
Star accused the minister of “double talk.”19 The Toronto Globe and 
Mail echoed the charge, reproaching Martin for being “less than 
forthcoming with his answers,” and demanding “Why the Delay?”20
Martin played for time. On 10 March, he summoned the 
ambassadors of Sweden, Finland, and Ireland to his East Block office, 
where he assured them that Canadian forces were ready to go. The 
delay was not Canada’s fault. To the consternation of his advisors, 
who watched the last bit of Canadian leverage slip away, he explained 
that the decision in principle had been made months earlier. Canada, 
he insisted, simply wanted clear answers to its questions about the 
force’s role and its prospects. He intended to get them.21
This was an impossible posture to maintain as the demand for 
action built over the next thirty-six hours. There were warnings from 
New York of escalating communal riots in Cyprus, Turkish threats to
17 New York to Ottawa, tel 356, 10 March 1964, RG 25, Vol 10130, Vol 
21-14-11-Cyprus, LAC.
18 “ Canada Gets Force Ready, Waits Word,” M o n tr e a l G a z e tte , 7 March 1964.
19 “ ’Not Shirking Duty, but...” T o r o n to  S ta r , 9 March 1964.
20 “ Cyprus: Why the Delay,” T o r o n to  G lo b e  a n d  M a il, 10 March 1964.
21 Mac Bow to Mr. Cadieux, 11 March 1964, RG 25, Vol 10130, File: 21-14-1-Cyprus, 
LAC, and Martin, “At the Right Hand of Power,” 422.
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in te rv e n e , a n d  B r it is h  h in ts  t h a t  it c o u ld  n o t h o ld  on  a lo n e .22 T h e s e  
w e re  c o n fir m e d  o n  th e  e v e n in g  o f  1 1  M a r c h , w h e n  th e  d e p u ty  U K  h ig h  
c o m m is s io n e r , J o h n  W a k e ly , h a n d e d  M a r t in  a n  u r g e n t m e s s a g e  fro m  
th e  S e c r e t a r y  o f  S t a t e  fo r C o m m o n w e a lth  R e la t io n s , D u n c a n  S a n d y s . 
U n le ss  s p e e d y  p ro g r e s s  w a s  m a d e , S a n d y s  t h r e a te n e d , L o n d o n  w o u ld  
re v ie w  its  C y p r u s  c o m m itm e n t  a s  e a r ly  a s  12  M a r c h . H e p re ss e d  
C a n a d a  “ t o  a n n o u n c e  im m e d ia te ly  its  w ill in g n e s s  to  p a r t ic ip a te  in  a  
u n  fo rce  in  th e  h o p e  t h a t  it w o u ld  le a d  o th e rs  to  fo llo w  s u it .” 23 T ir e d  
a n d  c r a n k y  u n d e r  th e  p re s s u re , M a r t in  w a s  n o t o p tim is t ic . “ T h e  
f in a n c ia l  s t r a its  o f  th e  u n  w e re  d e p lo ra b le  a n d  th e  s ize  o f  th e  u n  fo rce  
in a d e q u a te ,” h e  c o m p la in e d .24
A s  M a r t in  le ft  O t t a w a  th e  fo llo w in g  d a y  fo r e n g a g e m e n ts  n e a r  
T o r o n to , th e  d y n a m ic s  in  N e w  Y o r k  w e re  s h if t in g . T h o u g h  th e  Ir is h , 
in  n o  h u r r y  t o  h e lp  th e  B r it is h , c o u ld  n o t b e  c o u n te d  o n  fo r a n  e a r ly  
d e c is io n , th e  n e w s  fro m  o th e r  p o te n t ia l  c o n tr ib u to r s  w a s  p ro m is in g . 
F in la n d  w o u ld  n o t t a k e  a  f in a l d e c is io n  u n til  its  p re s id e n t r e tu r n e d  
to  H e ls in k i o n  14  M a r c h , b u t its  fo re ig n  m in is te r  e s t im a t e d  th e  o d d s  
o f  a p p r o v a l a t  99 p e r c e n t. T h is  w a s  th o u g h t  to  b e  e n o u g h  to  s a t is fy  
S w e d e n ’s d e s ire  fo r a n o th e r  n e u tr a l in  th e  fo rce , a n d  S to c k h o lm  
w a s  r e p o r t e d ly  r e a d y  t o  in d ic a te  its  a c c e p ta n c e  on  13  M a r c h . T h e  
S w e d is h  a n n o u n c e m e n t w o u ld  fu lf i l l  C a n a d a ’s re q u ir e m e n t for a n  
“ in te r n a tio n a l fo rc e ,” b u t w o u ld  co m e  to o  la te  fo r th e  B r it is h , w h o  
in s is te d  o n  a s s u r a n c e s  b y  12  M a r c h . M a r t in  a n d  P e a r s o n  c o n fe rr e d  
b y  p h o n e , a g r e e in g  t h a t  C a n a d a  w o u ld  t a k e  th e  r is k  o f  b e in g  th e  firs t  
to  a c t .  W h i le  th e  p r im e  m in is te r  h u rr ie d  t o  in fo rm  th e  H o u se , M a r t in  
t u r n e d  h is  g o v e r n m e n t J e t s t a r  s o u th , t o w a r d s  N e w  Y o r k  a n d  th e  u n .25
F o r  a lm o s t  a n  h o u r, th e  s m a ll  p la n e  c ir c le d  N e w  Y o r k  u n til  a  
b r e a k  in  th e  fo g  a n d  s n o w  a llo w e d  it t o  la n d . L a t e  for h is  a p p o in tm e n t 
w ith  th e  s e c r e ta r y -g e n e r a l, M a r t in  ru s h e d  d o w n to w n  to  in fo r m  U  
T h a n t  t h a t  C a n a d a  w a s  r e a d y  to  jo in  a  u n  fo rce  “ i f  a n d  w h e n  s u ch  
a  fo rce  w a s  c o n s t it u t e d  b y  th e  U N .” 26 T h e  m in is te r  w a s  p le a s e d  w ith
22 New York to Ottawa, tel 359, 10 March 1964 and tel 368, 11 March 1964, RG 25, 
Vol 10130, File 21-14-1-Cyprus, LAC.
23 Ross Campbell, Memorandum for the USSEA, 12 March 1964, RG 25, Vol 10130, 
File 21-14-1-Cyprus, LAC.
24 Ibid.
25 Ross Campbell, Memorandum for the USSEA, 12 March 1964, RG 25, Vol 10130, 
File 21-14-1-Cyprus, LAC; “Martin Spurred Cyprus Force Decision,” T o r o n to  S ta r , 
14 March 1964.
26 New York to Ottawa, tels 374 and 387, 12 March 1964, RG  25, Vol 10130, File 
21-14-1-Cyprus, LAC.
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U  T h a n t ’s a s s u r a n c e s  t h a t  u n  p e a c e k e e p e r s  w o u ld  n o t b e  in v o lv e d  in  
d is a r m in g  ir r e g u la r  fo rce s , b u t  w a s  a s to n is h e d  to  le a rn  t h a t  th e  u n  
le a d e r  c o u ld  n o t a s s u re  h im  t h a t  S w e d e n  h a d  a g r e e d  to  p a r t ic ip a te . 
U  T h a n t  in s is te d  t h a t  h e  c o u ld  d o  n o th in g  t o  h a s te n  S w e d e n ’s 
c o m m itm e n t. “ H is  p a s s iv i t y  a m a z e d  m e ,” M a r t in  w r o te  la te r. “ T h e  
w h o le  s h e b a n g  w a s  on  th e  b r in k  o f  c o lla p s e  a n d  U  T h a n t  d id  n ot 
r e a lis e  it. W h e n  he c la im e d  t h a t  h e  c o u ld  n o t m o v e  b e c a u s e  o f  la c k  o f  
fu n d s , I  re p lie d  a b ru p tly , ‘ W e  c a n n o t  a c t  lik e  s h o p k e e p e r s .’ ” 27
T h e  s tu n n e d  C a n a d ia n  r e tu r n e d  t o  O t t a w a  in  a  “ g lo o m y ” 
m o o d . T h e  fo llo w in g  m o rn in g , M a r t in  g a th e r e d  in  h is  o ffice  w ith  
h is  d e p u ty  m in is te r , M a r c e l  C a d ie u x ,  a n d  R o s s  C a m p b e ll ,  a  s m a r t  
a n d  o u ts p o k e n  a s s is ta n t  u n d e r - s e c r e ta r y  w h o m  M a r t in  lik e d  a n d  
t r u s t e d . T h e y  m a r v e lle d  a t  U  T h a n t ’s u n w ill in g n e s s  “ to  u se  h is  g r e a t  
o ffice  to  p e r s u a d e  th e  S w e d e s  a n d  th e  o th e r s  t o  jo in  th e  fo rc e .” 28 
P e r h a p s , M a r t in  w o n d e re d  a lo u d , C a n a d a  s h o u ld  ju s t  ig n o re  th e  u n  
a n d  e n c o u r a g e  th e  E u r o p e a n s  its e lf . S o m e o n e  s u g g e s te d  s e n d in g  a  
m e s s a g e  th r o u g h  th e  S w e d is h  a n d  F in n is h  a m b a s s a d o r s . M a y b e , 
M a r t in  a s k e d , h e  s h o u ld  c a ll  th e ir  fo re ig n  m in is te rs ?  C a d ie u x  s a id  
n o, b u t C a m p b e ll  lik e d  th e  id e a . “ W e  h a d  n o th in g  t o  lo s e ,” he a r g u e d , 
“ a n d  e v e r y t h in g  to  g a in .” 29
W it h  a  g la s s  o f  m ilk  a n d  a  s a n d w ic h  b y  h is  s id e , M a r t in  b e g a n  
to  w o r k  th e  p h o n e s , c a l l in g  h is  c o u n t e r p a r t s  in  D u b lin , S to c k h o lm , 
a n d  H e ls in k i. T h is  w a s  th e  k in d  o f  p e r s o n a l d ip lo m a c y  t h a t  h e  lo v e d , 
d r a w in g  on  th e  s h a r e d  “ p o lit ic a l  b o n d  b e tw e e n  fo re ig n  m in is te r s .” 30 
T h e  S w e d e s , it t u r n e d  o u t, w e re  s k e p t ic a l  o f  th e  F in n is h  p le d g e  a n d  
w e re  r e lu c ta n t  t o  a c t .  A f t e r  s e c u r in g  a  c o n d it io n a l c o m m itm e n t  fro m  
Ir e la n d , M a r t in  c o u ld  a s s u re  S to c k h o lm  o f  o th e r  n e u tr a l p a r t ic ip a n ts  
in  th e  fo r c e .31 It  w a s  e n o u g h . O n  th e  b a s is  o f  h is  t r a n s a t la n t ic  c a lls , 
h e  to ld  h is  c a b in e t  c o lle a g u e s  e a r ly  in  th e  a fte r n o o n  o f  13  M a r c h , 
I r e la n d  a n d  S w e d e n  w o u ld  jo in  th e  fo r c e .32 A s  th e  H o u se  o f  C o m m o n s
27 Paul Martin, A  V ery  P u b lic  L i f e ,  V ol 2: S o  M a n y  W o rld s  (Toronto: Deneau
5 4 7 .
28 Martin, “At the Right Hand of Power, 435.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Ross Campbell, Memorandum to Mr. Martin, 13 March 1964, RG  25, Vol 10130, 
File 21-14-11-Cyprus, LAC. As an anonymous External Affairs source explained to 
the Ottawa press, “Ireland triggered Sweden. Actually, the Irish agreement was a 
bit of a surprise.” See, “Martin Spurred Cyprus Force Decision,” T o r o n to  S ta r , 14 
March 1964.
32 Cabinet Conclusions, 13 March 1964, PC O , LAC.
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g a th e r e d  t h a t  e v e n in g  in  e m e r g e n c y  s e ss io n  t o  d e b a te  a n d  a p p ro v e  
th e  d e s p a tc h  o f  1,2 0 0  C a n a d ia n  p e a c e k e e p e rs , a n  a d v a n c e  c o n tin g e n t 
o f  t w e n ty -n in e  o ffic e rs  r a c e d  t o w a r d s  C y p r u s ,  s ig n a llin g  a  te m p o r a r y  
e n d  to  th e  cr is is  in  C y p r u s .
M a r t in  s a v o u r e d  h is  tr iu m p h . A s  p e a c e k e e p in g  h is to r ia n  A la n  
J a m e s  a r g u e s , it w a s  p e r h a p s  im m o d e s t  o f  h im  to  c la im  in  h is  m e m o irs  
t h a t  th e  fo rce  c a m e  in to  b e in g  s o le ly  a s  a  re s u lt  o f  h is  te le p h o n e  c a lls  
or t h a t  he w a s  its  a u th o r .33 S w e d e n  a n d  F in la n d  w e re  a lr e a d y  h e a d e d  
t h a t  w a y . A s  M a r t in  h im s e lf  c o n c e d e d  t o  th e  p re ss  a t  th e  t im e , “ I 
r e a lly  d id n ’t  do  t h a t  m u c h .” 34 B u t  w ith  B r it is h  a n d  T u r k is h  d e a d lin e s  
lo o m in g , M a r t in  fo rc e d  th e  p a c e  a n d  g a in e d  a  d a y  w h e n  m in u te s  
m a tte r e d . F o r  t h a t ,  h e  d e s e r v e d  th e  s h o w e r  o f  p ra is e  a n d  fa v o u ra b le  
p re ss  c o v e ra g e  t h a t  ra in e d  o n  h im  in  th e  s p r in g  o f  19 6 4 .35
T h e  p ra ise  w a s  s h o r t- liv e d . A s  M a r t in  fe a re d , C y p r u s  q u ic k ly  
b e c a m e  a  h e a d a c h e . T h e  p o lit ic a l  d e a d lo c k , fre q u e n t s k ir m is h in g  
a lo n g  th e  d e m a r c a tio n  lin e , a n d  th e  u n ’s f in a n c ia l  a r r a n g e m e n ts  
w h ic h  le ft  C a n a d a  a n d  th e  o th e r  c o n tr ib u to r s  s h o u ld e r in g  m o s t o f  th e  
c o s ts  m e a n t r e g u la r  d r u b b in g s  fo r C a n a d a ’s h a p le s s  fo re ig n  m in is te r  
a t  th e  h a n d s  o f  th e  o p p o s it io n  d u r in g  th e  n e x t  fe w  y e a r s . A n d  n o t 
ju s t  th e  o p p o s it io n . W h e n  E g y p t  t h r e w  C a n a d ia n  p e a c e k e e p e r s  o u t 
o f  th e  S in a i in  19 6 7 , th e  p r im e  m in is te r  c o u ld  h a r d ly  r e s tr a in  h im s e lf:  
“ I r e m a in  v e r y  w o r r ie d  t h a t  th is  fo rce  w ill  g o  th e  w a y  o f  [the U n ite d  
N a tio n s  E m e r g e n c y  F o rc e ] ,” P e a r s o n  s c o ld e d  M a r t in ;  “ h o ld  th e  lin e  
a n d  k e e p  th e  p e a c e  w ith o u t  d o in g  a n y t h in g  t o  b r in g  a b o u t a  p o lit ic a l  
s e tt le m e n t  a n d , in  th e  e n d , b e in g  a s k e d  t o  le a v e .” 36
C a n a d ia n  s k e p tic is m  d e e p e n e d  m a r k e d ly  o v e r  th e  n e x t  tw o  
d e c a d e s . In  p a r t ,  t h a t  r e f le c te d  th e  fo re ig n  p o lic y  p re fe re n c e s  o f  
P e a r s o n ’s s u c c e s so r , P ie r r e  T r u d e a u . T h e  M o n tr e a l  M e m b e r  o f  
P a r lia m e n t  h a d  co m e  t o  O t t a w a  d e te r m in e d  to  re s o lv e  C a n a d a ’s 
c o n s t itu t io n a l d if f ic u lt ie s , a n d  h e  w a s  s c o r n fu l o f  P e a r s o n ’s d is tr a c t in g  
in te r n a tio n a lis m . T h e  n e w  p rim e  m in is te r  w a n te d  a  m o re  m o d e st 
d ip lo m a c y , a n d  h is  fo re ig n  p o lic y  re v ie w , is s u e d  in  19 7 0 , ra n k e d  
p e a c e k e e p in g  a  lo w ly  fo u r th  on  its  lis t  o f  p r io r it ie s . M o re  im p o r ta n t , 
C a n a d ia n  fr u s tr a t io n  r e f le c te d  th e  a b s e n c e  o f  a n y  p o lit ic a l  p ro g r e s s
33 Alan James, K e e p in g  th e  P e a c e  in  th e  C y p r u s  C r is is  o f  1 9 6 3 - 6 4  (London: 
Palgrave, 2002), 110 -111.
34 Cited in “Martin Spurred Cyprus Force Decision,” T o r o n to  S ta r , 14 March 1964.
35 Donaghy, G r it , 214-215.
36 L.B. Pearson to Paul Martin, 22 August 1967, RG 25, Vol 10,648, File 
21-14-6-UNFICYP-4, LAC.
10
Canadian Military History, Vol. 24 [2015], Iss. 2, Art. 8
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol24/iss2/8
D O N A G H Y  | 1 93
Members of the Canadian contingent serving with u n ficyp  at an observation post in 
Trakhomas, Nicosia, Cyprus. 27 March 1964. (un Photo 86335). [United Nations 86335]
in  C y p r u s ,  th e  s t e a d y  d r a in  on  C a n a d a ’s co ffe rs , a n d  th e  g r o w in g  
fe a r  t h a t  C a n a d a ’s c o m m itm e n t  to  C y p r u s ,  w h ic h  s t i l l  t o ta l le d  o v e r  
500 tr o o p s  in  e a r ly  19 7 4 , m ig h t  b e  p e r m a n e n t. B e h in d  th e  sc e n e s , 
C a n a d ia n  p o lic y -m a k e r s  c a m p a ig n e d  h a r d  fo r f in a n c ia l  re fo rm  a n d  
c h a m p io n e d  p la n s  to  r e s tr u c tu r e  th e  U n ite d  N a tio n s  P e a c e k e e p in g  
F o rc e  in  C y p r u s  (u n f i c y p ) a s  a  m u c h  s m a lle r  o b s e r v e r  fo rce  in  19 74 , 
in  19 7 8 , a n d  a g a in , tw ic e , in  th e  19 8 0 s. T h e ir  e ffo rts  w e re  fr u it le s s , 
d is m is s e d  b y  fo rce  c o m m a n d e r s  a n d  u n  e x p e r t s  a s  to o  r is k y , or 
o p p o s e d  b y  S e c u r it y  C o u n c il  m e m b e r s  F r a n c e  a n d  th e  S o v ie t  U n io n , 
b o th  a n x io u s  to  a v o id  a b s o r b in g  u n f i c y p  c o s t s .37
B y  th e  la te  19 7 0 s , c o n v in c e d  t h a t  u n f i c y p  h a d  “ b e c o m e  p a r t  
o f  th e  p ro b le m ” a n d  t h a t  th e  s ta le m a te  r e f le c te d  a  “ la c k  o f  p o lit ic a l  
w i l l ” a m o n g  a ll  th e  m a jo r  s ta k e h o ld e r s — th e  G r e e k s , th e  T u r k s , th e  
C y p r io t s ,  a n d  th e  u n — C a n a d a  in c r e a s in g ly  let its  fr u s tr a t io n s  s h o w .38
37 Details on these various initiatives are on the file 21-14-6-UNFICYP-1, in RG 
25, LAC.
38 Athens to Ottawa, tel 747, 5 July 1977, RG 25, Vol 10,648, File 21-14-6-UNFICYP-4; 
Klaus Goldschlag’s marginalia on T.C . Hammond to Goldschlag, DFR-1488, 3 May 
1979, RG 25, Vol 10,646, File 21-14-6-UNFICYP-1, LAC.
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D o n  J a m ie s o n , fo re ig n  m in is te r  fro m  19 7 6  t o  19 7 9 , to ld  fr ie n d s  t h a t  he 
w a s  b a ff le d  b y  th e  “ b iz a r r e  a n d  s a d ” d is p u te , a n d  p u b lic ly  s ig n a lle d  h is  
“ d is a p p o in tm e n t” in  D e c e m b e r  1 9 7 6 .39 H is  P r o g r e s s iv e  C o n s e r v a t iv e  
s u c c e s so r , F lo r a  M a c D o n a ld , w a s  e v e n  m o re  o u ts p o k e n . “ W e  c a n n o t  
b e  e x p e c te d  t o  c o n tin u e  o u r  p a r t ic ip a t io n  in d e fin ite ly ,” sh e  w r o te  a n  
o p p o s it io n  b a c k b e n c h e r  in  19 7 9 , “ u n le s s  w e  s e e  so m e  in d ic a t io n  t h a t  
a  n e g o tia te d  s e tt le m e n t  c a n  b e  r e a c h e d .”40 A l la n  M a c E a c h e n , fo re ig n  
m in is te r  fro m  1 9 8 2 -1 9 8 4 , to ld  u n  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  J a v ie r  P e r e z  de 
C u e l la r  t h a t  h e  w o u ld  c o n tin u e  to  b a c k  th e  fo rce , b u t  he “ h a d  t o  h o ld  
m y  n o s e ” t o  do i t .41 “A g r e e d ,” s ig h e d  F o re ig n  M in is t e r  J o e  C la r k  in  
19 8 6 , w h e n  a p p r o v in g  y e t  a n o th e r  e x te n s io n  to  u n f i c y p ’s m a n d a te , 
w e a r i ly  a d d in g  in  p a r e n th e s is , “ a g a in .” A  c h e e k y  a d v is o r  a d d e d  a n  
e x c la m a tio n  m a r k .42
D e s p ite  th e ir  fr u s tr a t io n s , w h e n  O t t a w a  d ip lo m a ts  a n d  m in is te r s  
r e v ie w e d  C a n a d a ’s c o m m itm e n t  to  u n f i c y p , t h e y  fo u n d  c o m p e llin g  
re a s o n s  t o  s ta y . M o s t  im p o r ta n t , o f  c o u r s e , th e  u n  m is s io n  e s s e n t ia lly  
w o rk e d , la r g e ly  p r e s e r v in g  th e  s t a b i l i t y  t h a t  w a s  se e n  a s  th e  v i t a l  
p re c o n d it io n  fo r in te r -c o m m u n a l t a lk s  a n d  a n  e v e n tu a l s e tt le m e n t. 
“ T h e  u n  fo rce  w a s  s t i l l  re q u ir e d  t o  p re v e n t a  re v e rs io n  t o  v io le n c e  
a n d  t o  p e r m it  m o v e s  to w a r d s  a  b e t t e r  p o lit ic a l  s e t t le m e n t,” M a r t in  
c h a lle n g e d  h is  s k e p t ic a l  p r im e  m in is te r  in  la te  19 6 7 , a m id  re n e w e d  
T u r k is h  t h r e a ts  to  in v a d e . “ C a n a d a  h a d  no o p tio n .”43 S ix  y e a r s  on, 
h is  s u c c e s so r , M itc h e ll  S h a r p , s o u n d e d  a  s im ila r  n o te . “ T h e  p re se n ce  
o f  th e  u n f i c y p ,” th e  m in is te r  a s s u r e d  h is  c a b in e t  c o lle a g u e s  in  
N o v e m b e r  19 7 3 , “ h a s  b e e n  e s s e n tia l in  h e lp in g  to  p re v e n t r e la t iv e ly  
m in o r  lo c a l  in c id e n ts  fro m  e s c a la t in g  o u t o f  h a n d .”44
39 Cited in Paul Martin, T h e  L o n d o n  D ia r ie s , 1 9 7 4 - 1 9 7 9 ,  edited by William Young, 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 393; see also, Don Jamieson, “Canada’s 
International Responsibilities: Speech to the Canadian Institute of International 
Affairs,” Canada, Department of External Affairs, S ta te m e n ts  a n d  S p e e c h e s , No. 
76/32, 3 December 1976.
40 Flora MacDonald to Roland de Corneille, 22 November 1979, RG 25, Vol 10,648, 
File 21-14-6-UNFICYP-4, LAC.
41 A .A . Despres to File, DFR-1990, 7 June 1983, RG 25, Vol 12,665, File 
21-14-6-UNFICYP-1, LAC.
42 Clark’s marginalia on J.H. Taylor, Memorandum for the Minister, IDR-4347, 24 
November 1986, and MINA to IDR, 1 December 1986, File 21-14-6-UNFICYP-1, 
Historical Section, DFATD.
43 Cabinet Conclusions, 21 December 1967, PC O , LAC.
44 Sharp, Memorandum to Cabinet, 22 November 1973, RG 25, Vol 10,648, File 
21-14-6-UNFICYP-1, LAC.
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This remained true for Canadian policy-makers even after Greek- 
Cypriot nationalists overthrew Archbishop Makarios in July 1974, 
sparking a Turkish invasion. u n f i c y p  was caught in the middle. The 
crisis drew the u n  force, including its Canadian contingent, deep 
into the dangerous business of negotiating ceasefires, evacuating 
civilians, and staring down combatant forces, most famously at 
the Ledra Palace Hotel, Nicosia International Airport, and Camp 
Kronborg. The summer’s fighting, which left two Canadians dead 
and seventeen wounded, fuelled doubts about the mission in Canada. 
“Canadian troops,” insisted the Globe and Mail, “should be brought 
home.”45 At the very least, Trudeau argued, other countries should 
help shoulder the burden. But time was short, and when the u n  
asked for more Canadian troops to handle u n f i c y p ’s expanded role, 
ministers squirmed uncomfortably, hesitated and delayed, and then 
doubled Canada’s contingent, more conscious than ever of u n f i c y p ’s 
humanitarian element.46
For Canadian diplomats, the crisis, which soon settled back into 
a familiar impasse, underlined u n f i c y p ’s importance as an essential 
source of regional stability. “Peacekeeping activities in Cyprus,” 
insisted Ted Lee, Canada’s high commissioner to the island, “have 
since their inception made a contribution to stability in region ... 
Cyprus without u n f ic y p  would not have enjoyed the stability, albeit 
relative and precarious, it had prior to the anti-Makarios coup and 
consequent Turkish intervention. Subsequently, u n f ic y p  has been the 
critical ingredient in minimizing the potential for further military 
action.”47 Mark MacGuigan, the clear-sighted pragmatist who was 
named secretary of state for external affairs in 1980, bluntly defended 
Canada’s role in the following terms: “There is no warfare going on and 
often that is all you can achieve in the world ... You can prevent people 
from killing each other. You can’t always make them love each other.”48
But Canadians were hardly boy scouts. Liberal and Conservative 
governments alike backed the u n  mission because it clearly advanced 
Canada’s foreign policy interests in n a t o , at the u n , and in a number 
of bilateral settings. As a n a t o  ally, Canada had an obvious Cold War
45 G lo b e  a n d  M a il, 16 July 1974.
46 Cabinet Conclusions, 25 July 1974, PC O , LAC.
47 Tel Aviv to Ottawa, tel 1188, 15 September 1976, RG 25, Vol 10,648, File 
21-14-6-UNFICYP-4, LAC.
48 Cited in Ottawa to Permanent Representative in New York, tel DFR-1740, 6 
June 1980, RG 25, Vol 10646, File 21-14-6-UNFICYP-1, LAC.
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s ta k e  in  d e fu s in g  te n s io n s  b e tw e e n  G r e e c e  a n d  T u r k e y , s ta b iliz in g  
a n d  re in fo rc in g  th e  a l l ia n c e ’s “ s e n s itiv e  s o u th e rn  f la n k .” T h is  w a s  
m o re  im p o r ta n t  t h a n  e v e r  fo llo w in g  th e  S o v ie t  U n io n ’s in v a s io n  o f 
A fg h a n is t a n  in  19 7 9 , w h e n  in s t a b i l i ty  th r o u g h  a n  “ a r c  o f  c r is is ” in  th e  
E a s t e r n  M e d ite r r a n e a n  m ig h t  lim it  u s  a c c e s s  to  b a s e s  in  G r e e c e  a n d  
to  T u r k is h  a ir s p a c e .49 D e fe n c e  p o lic y  o ffic ia ls  e m b ra c e d  u n f i c y p  a s  
o n e  b r ig h t  s p o t  in  O t t a w a ’s o th e r w is e  la c k lu s tr e  p e r fo r m a n c e  in  n a t o  
u n d e r  T r u d e a u . “ T o  so m e  e x t e n t ,” a r g u e d  R o s s  F r a n c is , h e a d  o f  
d e fe n ce  re la tio n s  in  E x t e r n a l  A f f a ir s ,  “ o u r c o n tr ib u tio n  to  U N F I C Y P  
h a s  o ffse t  o u r r e la t iv e ly  m o d e s t  s h a re  in  W e s te r n  d e fe n c e .” 50 A  re tre a t  
fro m  C y p r u s ,  a d v is e d  o ffic ia ls , w o u ld  s u r e ly  s tr a in  re la tio n s  w ith  
W a s h in g t o n  a n d  L o n d o n , a s  w e ll a s  w ith  C a n a d a ’s s m a lle r  n a t o  
a llie s , w h o  m ig h t  w e ll b e  o b lig e d  t o  p ic k  u p  th e  s la c k .
S u p p o r t  fo r u n f i c y p  a ls o  w e ig h e d  in  C a n a d ia n  p o lic y  a t  th e  
U n ite d  N a tio n s , w h e re  it w a s  r e g u la r ly  c ite d  a s  e v id e n c e  o f  O t t a w a ’s 
c o m m itm e n t  t o  th e  o r g a n is a t io n ’s c h a r te r  a n d  th e  p r in c ip le  o f  
c o lle c t iv e  s e c u r ity . M o re  p r a c t ic a lly , s h r e w d  d ip lo m a ts  re m in d e d  th e ir  
p o lit ic a l  m a s te r s , C a n a d a ’s ro le  in  C y p r u s  p ro v id e d  r e a d y  g r o u n d s  for 
d o d g in g  “ le ss  d e s ir a b le  o p e r a t io n s .” It  w a s  w ie ld e d  th is  w a y  in  1 9 7 7  
w h e n  B r it is h  F o re ig n  S e c r e t a r y  D a v id  O w e n  s u g g e s te d  a n  u n p a la ta b le  
C a n a d ia n  c o n tr ib u tio n  to  a  p e a c e k e e p in g  fo rce  in  R h o d e s ia , a n d  
a g a in  in  19 8 2 , w h e n  th e  U n ite d  S t a te s  s o u g h t to  e n lis t  C a n a d a  in  a  
m u lt i-n a t io n a l fo rce  in  th e  M id d le  E a s t .51
T h e  fo rce  p ro v e d  a  u s e fu l in s tr u m e n t  a s  w e ll fo r m a n a g in g  
b i la te r a l  re la t io n s  w ith  G r e e c e  a n d  T u r k e y , p r o v id in g  a  “ lo g ic a l b a s is ” 
fo r C a n a d a  to  a v o id  t a k in g  s id e s  in  th e  t r ic k y  d is p u te  on  th e  g r o u n d s  
t h a t  th is  m ig h t  im p a ir  its  im p a r t ia l i t y .52
T h e r e  w e re  c o m p e llin g  d o m e s tic  re a s o n s  t o  s t a y  th e  c o u r s e  to o . 
C a n a d ia n s  lik e d  p e a c e k e e p in g . A c c o r d in g  to  h is to r ia n  N o r m a n  
H illm e r, it le t  th e m  b e lie v e  t h a t  C a n a d a  c o u ld  b e  “ th e  w o r ld ’s 
c o n sc ie n c e , u n ta in te d  b y  p o w e r  p o lit ic s  a n d  c o n s id e ra tio n s  o f  n a r ro w
49 de Montigny Marchand, Memorandum for the Minister, DFR-1379, 28 April 
1983, RG  25, Vol 12,562, File 21-14-6-UNFICYP-1, LAC.
50 Ottawa to Delhi (Masse Only), tel IDR-4450, 22 November 1983, RG 25, Vol 
12,665, File 21-14-6-UNFICYP-1, LAC.
51 de Montigny Marchand, Memorandum for the Minister, DFR-1378, 25 April 
1983, RG  25, Vol 12,562, File 21-14-6-UNFICYP-1, LAC.
52 Ibid.
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or selfish interests.”63 Moreover, an influx of Greek immigrants 
beginning in the mid-1960s had created a formidable constituency of 
over 200,000 new Canadians with a strong stake in Cyprus.53 4 56Indeed, 
domestic politics could be decisive. When the u n  asked Ottawa for 
sixty extra soldiers to replace a departing Swedish contingent in 
1987, the reaction among the professional diplomats and soldiers was 
uniformly hostile. Canada’s u n  Ambassador Stephen Lewis, a former 
provincial politician, reached a different conclusion, and he appealed 
directly to Foreign Minister Joe Clark. “Above all,” Lewis argued, 
“there is a critical political dimension to all of this, which cannot 
be overlooked. The provision of 60 additional soldiers allows the 
Secretary of State for External Affairs (and the prime minister) to give 
positive public credence, yet again, to our unswerving commitment 
to multilateralism and the kind of special role Canada plays in this 
world.”66 Clark backed his ambassador.
But the stable Cold War world that had long underpinned 
Canada’s calculus was already changing. Glasnost (“openness”) and 
perestroika (“restructuring”) had begun to shake Mikhail Gorbachev’s 
Soviet Union, which quickly lost its grip on Eastern Europe. By 1989, 
the Berlin Wall was down and the Cold War over. Peace brought 
different dangers, but also hope, and Western support for renewed 
forms of internationalism surged, manifest most clearly in a wave of 
enthusiasm for new u n  peacekeeping missions. Canadians backed the 
u n ’s ambitious agenda, and between 1988 and 1993 Canada joined 
sixteen u n  operations (more than it had in the entire forty years 
after 1945).66 There were soon 500 Canadian soldiers along the Iran- 
Iraq border, and hundreds more in Namibia and war-torn Central 
America. Tougher missions in Cambodia, the Western Sahara, and 
the Balkans beckoned. These were costlier too. Between 1945 and 
1980, Canada had spent $266 million on peacekeeping; in 1992-1993
53 Norman Hillmer, “Peacekeeping: The Inevitability of Canada’s Role,” in Michael 
A. Hennessy and B. J. C. McKercher, eds., W ar in  th e  T w e n tie th  C e n tu r y :  R e fle c t io n s  
a t C e n t u r y ’s  E n d  (London: Praeger, 2003), 145.
54 See, for example, A.E. Gotlieb, Memorandum for the Minister, DFR-1888, 16 
June 1981, RG 25, Vol 10648, File 21-14-6-UNFICYP-4, LAC.
55 Permanent Representative in New York to Ottawa, tel 2607, 7 August 1987, RG 
25, Vol 19430, File 21-14-6-UNFICYP-1, LAC.
56 Figures cited in Manon Tessier and Michel Fortmann, “The Conservative 
Approach to International Peacekeeping,” in Nelson Michaud and Kim  Richard 
Nossal, eds., D ip lo m a t ic  D e p a r tu r e s:  T h e  C o n s e r v a tiv e  E r a  in  C a n a d ia n  F o r e ig n  
P o lic y ,  1 9 8 4 - 9 3  (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 2003), 118.
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M -113  A P C s o f the Canadian Co ntin gen t on patrol near N icosia. 28 A ugust 1974. [United 
Nations 69123]
a lo n e , th e  b ill  to p p e d  $ 1 7 5  m ill io n .57 B u r d e n e d  b y  m a s s iv e  fe d e ra l 
g o v e r n m e n t  d e fic its , P r o g r e s s iv e  C o n s e r v a t iv e  P r im e  M in is te r  B r ia n  
M u lr o n e y  s t r u g g le d  w ith  th e  s u r g in g  c o s ts .
In  A p r i l  19 9 1 , M u lr o n e y  ta p p e d  B a r b a r a  M c D o u g a ll  a s  h is  
n e w  fo re ig n  m in is te r  w ith  a  m a n d a te  to  c h a r t  C a n a d a ’s re s p o n s e  
to  t h is  s h if t in g  w o r ld  o rd er. It  w a s  a  s o lid  a p p o in tm e n t. T h e  fo r ty -  
fo u r y e a r  o ld  M c D o u g a ll  w a s  a  t r a in e d  e c o n o m is t , w h o  h a d  c a r v e d  
o u t a n  u n lik e ly  c a r e e r  a s  a  p ro m in e n t in v e s tm e n t  a n a ly s t  a m o n g  
th e  t r a d it io n a lly  m a le - d o m in a te d  b a s t io n s  o f  T o r o n to ’s f in a n c ia l 
h u b . S h e  t r a d e d  s p r e a d s h e e ts  fo r p o lit ic s  in  19 8 4 , w h e n  sh e  jo in e d  
M u lr o n e y ’s c a b in e t  a s  a  ju n io r  m in is te r , w in n in g  p ro m o tio n  t o  th e  
s e n io r  e m p lo y m e n t a n d  im m ig r a tio n  p o rtfo lio  in  19 8 8 . H er h a n d lin g  
o f  th e  N a tio n a l A c t io n  C o m m it t e e  on  th e  S t a tu s  o f  W o m e n , a n d  h er 
h a r d lin e  a p p r o a c h  t o  im m ig r a tio n  re fo rm  c o n fir m e d  h e r r e p u ta tio n  
a s  a  s tro n g  a n d  s k il l fu l  p o lit ic a l  p e r fo r m e r .58 “ S h e ’s a  w a r m  c u d d ly
57 Cited in Tessier and Fortmann, “The Conservative Approach,” 121.
58 Brian Mulroney, M e m o ir s , 1 9 3 9 -1 9 9 3  (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2007), 947, 
873, 1004. See also Charlotte Gray, “New Faces in Old Places: The making of Foreign 
Policy,” in Fen Hampson and Christopher Maule (eds.), C a n a d a  A m o n g  N a tio n s , 19 9 2 ­
93: A  N e w  W orld  O r d er ?  (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1992), 19-21.
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la d y — a n d  t o u g h  a s  n a ils ,” q u ip p e d  o n e  T o r o n to  a d m ir e r .69 F in a n c ia l ly  
p ru d e n t, s k e p tic a l, a n d  in d e p e n d e n t-m in d e d , M c D o u g a ll  h a d  few  
f ix e d  c o n c e p tio n s  a b o u t fo re ig n  p o lic y  a n d  w a s  r e a d y  to  c o n fr o n t a  
c h a n g in g  w o rld .
H er s k e p tic is m  w a s  re in fo r c e d  b y  th e  re s t le s s  c a d r e  o f  d ip lo m a ts  
w h o  h a d  jo in e d  E x t e r n a l  A f f a ir s  in  th e  19 6 0 s a n d  n o w  fille d  its  to p  
r a n k s . T h e y  m is t r u s t e d  th e  p o s t w a r  “ g o ld e n  a g e ” a n d  th e  P e a r s o n ia n  
in te r n a tio n a lis m  t h a t  u n d e r p in n e d  C a n a d a ’s c o m m itm e n t  t o  C y p r u s .  
T h e y  d is m is s e d  th e  “ r e g a l a m b a s s a d o r s ” w h o  p o p u la te d  C a n a d ia n  
e m b a s s ie s  d u r in g  th e ir  a p p re n tic e s h ip  a s  “ r id ic u lo u s  a n d  o ffe n s iv e .” 59 60 
F o r  P a u l  H e in b e c k e r , w h o  jo in e d  th is  c o h o r t  in  19 6 5 , th is  w a s  “ a  
m a d e - in - C a n a d a  g e n e ra tio n , to u g h -m in d e d , s e lf-c o n fid e n t a n d  s a v v y , 
e v e n  a  l i t t le  r u t h le s s .” 61 T h e s e  w e re , he a d d e d , “ n o -n o n s e n se , n o ­
b u lls h it , g e t- it -d o n e , s h r in k - fr o m -n o -o n e  k in d  o f  p e o p le .” 62
T h e  m in is te r  se n t a  s tro n g  s ig n a l fo r c h a n g e  r ig h t  fro m  th e  s t a r t .  
J u s t  w e e k s  o n  th e  jo b , sh e  w a s  a s k e d  t o  a p p ro v e  th e  ro u tin e  u n  re q u e s t 
to  re n e w  C a n a d a ’s u n f i c y p  c o m m itm e n t  fo r a n o th e r  s ix  m o n th s . 
S h e  r e lu c ta n t ly  a g r e e d , b u t in s is te d  t h a t  it w a s  t im e  to  “ re v ie w  
th e  w h o le  is s u e  o f  p e a c e k e e p in g — a n d  m a y b e  fo rce  th e  is s u e .” 63 H er 
m e s s a g e  e c h o e d  in  E x t e r n a l  A ff a ir s ,  a n d  b y  th e  e n d  o f  J u n e  19 9 1 , 
d ip lo m a t M ic h a e l D a w s o n  a n d  L ie u t e n a n t - C o lo n e l  T o n y  A n d e r s o n  
h a d  r e - e x a m in e d  C a n a d a ’s ro le  in  C y p r u s .  T h e ir  p a p e r  w e ig h e d  th e  
m o u n tin g  m a n p o w e r  a n d  f is c a l d e m a n d s  o n  C a n a d ia n  p e a c e k e e p in g , 
th e  fa ile d  e ffo r ts  to  r e - s tr u c tu r e  a n d  r e - f in a n c e  th e  fo rce  in  N e w  Y o r k , 
a n d  th e  e n d le s s  d e a d lo c k  in  C y p r u s  its e lf . T h e  tw o  a n a ly s t s  r e v ie w e d  
th e  a r g u m e n ts  for a n d  a g a in s t  th e  s t a t u s  q u o  in  fa m il ia r  te r m s , b u t 
g r e a t ly  e x p a n d e d  th e  r a n g e  o f  a v a ila b le  o p tio n s . C a n a d a  c o u ld  s t a y  
in d e fin ite ly , flee  im m e d ia te ly , o r m a in ta in  its  c u r re n t  c o n tr ib u tio n ,
59 Cited in Ian Hunter, “Barbara McDougall: will she be the next to lead the 
Tories?” O tta w a  C it iz e n , 31 March 1991.
60 Earl Drake, A  S tu b b le -J u m p e r  in  S tr ip e d  P a n t s :  M e m o ir s  o f  a P r a ir ie  D ip lo m a t  
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 39, and Confidential Interviews.
61 Paul Heinbecker, “Burney’s prescription is not a good fit for today’s Washington,” 
D ip lo m a t  a n d  I n te r n a tio n a l C a n a d a  M a g a z in e  (May-June, 2005).
62 Cited in Frank Edwards, “ Glen Shortliffe, 72/ Diplomat, Civil Servant,” G lo b e  
a n d  M a il , 22 May 2010.
63 de Montigny Marchand, Memorandum for the Minister, IDR-2181, 12 June 1991, 
and McDougall’s marginal notes, RG 25, Vol 25,050, File 21-14-6-UNFICYP-1, LAC.
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w h ile  s e t t in g  a  d a te  fo r its  d e p a r tu r e  u n le s s  th e r e  w a s  c le a r  e v id e n c e  
o f  p ro g r e s s . D a w s o n  a n d  A n d e r s o n  fa v o u re d  th e  t h ir d  o p tio n .64
T h r o u g h  J u ly  a n d  A u g u s t ,  o ffic ia ls  fro m  E x t e r n a l  A f f a ir s  a n d  
N a tio n a l  D e fe n c e  h a m m e r e d  o u t a  s t r a t e g y  fo r w ith d r a w a l. A  d e a l 
w a s  e a s ily  s tr u c k : th e  d ip lo m a ts  p ro m is e d  t o  b a c k  th e  m i l i t a r y ’s 
d e sire  to  q u it  C y p r u s ,  in c r e a s in g ly  d is p a r a g e d  a s  a  “ s u m m e r  c a m p ” 
w h e re  c o m b a t  s k il ls  w e n t t o  e ro d e . In  e x c h a n g e , N a tio n a l D e fe n c e  
b ra s s  s u p p o r te d  E x t e r n a l  A f f a i r s ’ c a m p a ig n  fo r a  c o n tin u in g  m il i t a r y  
p re se n c e  in  p o s t - C o ld  W a r  G e r m a n y .65 T h e  t im in g  s e e m e d  p e r fe c t . 
D u r in g  th e  s u m m e r, u s  P r e s id e n t  G e o r g e  B u s h  h a d  p e r s u a d e d  th e  
fo u r m a in  p a r t ie s  in  th e  C y p r u s  d is p u te  to  m e e t  in  N e w  Y o r k  for t a lk s  
w ith  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  P e r e z  d e  C u e lla r . C o n c e r n s  a b o u t C a n a d a ’s 
u n  c o m m itm e n t  c o u ld  b e  t u r n e d  a s id e  b y  c it in g  O t t a w a ’s w ill in g n e s s  
to  se n d  m in e -c le a r in g  s p e c ia lis ts  to  C y p r u s  a s  p a r t  o f  a  c o n fid e n c e ­
b u ild in g  m e a s u r e  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  th e  t a lk s .  In  e a r ly  S e p te m b e r , 
M c D o u g a ll  b le s s e d  a  p la n  to  p u s h  th e  u n  to  f in d  a  C y p r u s  s o lu tio n  b y  
m a k in g  it c le a r  t o  s ta k e h o ld e r s  t h a t  w h e th e r  o r n o t th e r e  w a s  p ro g r e s s , 
C a n a d a  w o u ld  t a k e  a  “ h a r d  lo o k ” a t  its  c o m m itm e n t  a ft e r  1 9 9 4 .66 
T h e  fo re ig n  m in is te r , in  N e w  Y o r k  fo r th e  u n ’s G e n e r a l  A s s e m b ly , to ld  
P e r e z  d e  C u e l la r  t h a t  C a n a d a  w o u ld  n o t s t a y  in d e fin ite ly .
T h e  n e w s  t h a t  fa ll  w a s  n o t h o p e fu l. T o u r in g  C y p r u s  in  N o v e m b e r, 
A u s t r ia n  P r e s id e n t  K u r t  W a ld h e im , a  fo rm e r  u n  s e c r e ta r y -g e n e r a l, 
s u r p r is e d  o b s e r v e rs  b y  a b r u p t ly  s u g g e s t in g  t h a t  A u s t r ia ’s c o n tin g e n t 
o u g h t to  le a v e .67 A  w e e k  la te r, a f t e r  m o n th s  o f  n e g o tia tio n s , T u r k is h  
c o m m a n d e r s  in  N o r th e r n  C y p r u s  r e je c te d  p la n s  fo r th e  m in e -c le a r in g  
c o n fid e n c e -b u ild in g  e x e rc is e . O p e r a t io n  S p ir a l, b it te r ly  jo k e d  th e  
P e r m a n e n t  M is s io n  in  N e w  Y o r k , “ w a s  s p u n .” 68 M o re  w o r r y in g  s t i ll , 
A th e n s  a n d  A n k a r a  re fu s e d  to  p u rs u e  th e ir  t a lk s ,  le a v in g  B u s h  
d o u b tfu l o f  p ro g r e s s  a n d  th e  u n  S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  o p e n ly  p e s s im is tic . 
“ B o t h  T u r k is h  a n d  G r e e k  C y p r io t s  h a v e  c o m e  t o  liv e  w ith  th e  s t a t u s  
q u o  a n d  e n jo y  th e  b e n e fit  o f  i t ,” w r o te  C a n a d a ’s h ig h  c o m m is s io n e r  to
64 Michael Dawson to General B.A. Goetze, and attached “Paper to Review Canada’s 
Contribution to U N FICYP,” RG 25, Vol 25,050, File 21-14-6-UNFICYP-1, LAC.
65 Ken Calder to Jeremy Kinsman, 4 October 1991, RG 25, Vol 25,050, File 
21-14-6-UNIFCYP-1, LAC.
66 Ibid, and de Montigny Marchand, Memorandum for the Minister, RWR-2704, 13 
September 1991, RG 25, Vol 25,050, File 21-14-6-UNFICYP-1, LAC.
67 Vienna to Ottawa, tel 205, 11 November 1991, RG 25, Vol 25,050, File 
21-14-6-UNFICYP-1, LAC.
68 Permanent Representative New York to Ottawa, tel 7220, 19 November 1991, RG 
25, Vol 25,050, File 21-14-6-UNFICYP-1, LAC.
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Cyprus, Michael Bell, and there was “no end in sight.”69 McDougall 
agreed, and when her officials asked to kick-start u n  consultations on 
the long-term future of u n f ic y p , she demurred. Instead, she resolved 
on a tougher line in her forthcoming talks with us Secretary of State 
Jim Baker and the new u n  Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali.
Canada’s ambassador in Washington, Derek Burney, was doubtful. 
The u s  administration had a large stake in Cyprus, whose future was 
carefully monitored by the powerful Greek-American community, 
and any retreat in Cyprus would come with a price. “We should not 
stake out positions we cannot sustain,” the veteran diplomat warned 
his rookie minister, reminding her that recent Canadian efforts to 
place u n f i c y p  on a better financial basis had ended in a “humiliating 
retreat with our tail between our legs.”70 McDougall was undeterred. 
When she met with Baker and Boutros-Ghali in January, she was 
firm and forthright. Canada would not act rashly, she promised, but 
it was “time to terminate.” Ottawa would give official notice of its 
intention to leave in June 1992, and be gone “within two years.”71
McDougall’s demarche stunned the Americans, who described 
it as a “bombshell.” Baker’s office bluntly warned Burney “not to 
do anything precipitous.”72 London too was skeptical, wondering if 
radical change was “desirable and feasible.”73 But McDougall’s threat 
concentrated minds wonderfully. When Greek Foreign Minister 
Antonis Samaras heard of the deadline— “devastating”— he promised 
a new round of successful talks. “This is good,” replied McDougall, 
for “without demonstrable progress on the substance, we shall give 
formal notice that the Canadians will pull out.”74 There were other 
signs that Canadian pressure was working. Washington and London 
both accelerated their efforts to restart communal talks, while in New 
York, Marrack Goulding, the u n  under-secretary for peacekeeping,
69 Tel Aviv to Ottawa, tel 8751, 21 November 1991, RG 25, Vol 25,050, File 
21-14-6-UNFICYP-1, LAC.
70 Washington to Ottawa, tel 2440, 8 January 1992, RG 25, Vol 25,050, File 
21-14-6-UNFICYP-1, LAC.
71 Reid Morden, Memorandum for the Minister, IDR-1042, 9 January 1992, RG 25, 
Vol 25,050, File 21-14-6-UNFICYP-1, LAC.
72 Washington to Ottawa, tel 513, 17 January 1992, RG 25, Vol 25,505, File 
21-14-6-UNFICYP-1, LAC.
73 London to Ottawa, tel 4025, 21 January 1992, RG  25, Vol 25,505, File 
21-14-6-UNFICYP-1, LAC.
74 Prague/CSCE Del to Ottawa, tel Cdel-04, 30 January 1992, RG 25, Vol 25,0505, 
File 21-14-6-UNFICYP-1, LAC.
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began to canvas options for a smaller, more manageable force in 
Cyprus. Indeed, by June, progress was encouraging enough to prompt 
McDougall herself to head to the region to assess the situation. She 
was armed with a “non-paper” offering a Canadian contribution to 
a re-structured “mixed mission” of observers supported by a small 
infantry component.75
The minister’s quick trip thorough Athens, Ankara, and Cyprus 
was cheering. She was skeptical of the region’s bureaucrats, who 
suffered from too much history and not enough trust. “Officials are 
generally defensive and recriminatory,” she reported, “UN reps are 
washed out.”76 The minister found her political counterparts much 
better company, “more directed to a positive future and willing to 
break the patterns of the past.” She was particularly impressed by 
Cypriot President George Vassiliou, “a leader genuinely in search 
of reconciliation.”77 Given the renewed prospects for progress and 
a chance to earn a return on the investments of a generation of 
Canadian soldiers, McDougall decided that “we ought to give it a last 
shot.” A  week later, Canada extended its mission another six months, 
refraining from making good its threat to go.
Cyprus remained a Canadian priority during the summer of 
1992. On McDougall’s advice, Mulroney raised it at the Group of 
Seven (G7) Summit in Munich, which endorsed his demand for faster 
progress. But by fall, momentum was stalled again. When Canadian 
representatives pressed for “significant redefinition and downsizing” 
at the September troop contributors meeting, they encountered 
renewed u n  hesitations.78 From u n  sources, they learned too that 
the latest round of inter-communal talks were going “very badly.”79 
In State Department and Whitehall corridors, American and British 
diplomats and ministers, sotto voce, began to whisper that Ottawa 
ought to stay. Nonsense, interjected Canada’s high commissioner to 
Cyprus, Norman Spector. An influential Tory loyalist who had served
75 Michael Brock to IFB, IDS-1869, 22 May 1992, RG 25, Vol 25,505, File 
21-14-6-UNFICYP-1, LAC.
76 Athens/Mindel to Ottawa, tel Mdel-2, 2 June 1992, RG 25, Vol 25,505, File 
21-14-6-UNFICYP-1, LAC.
77 Tel Aviv to Ottawa, tel 214, 4 June 1992, RG 25, Vol 27,639, File 
21-14-6-UNCICYP-1, LAC.
78 Ottawa to Tel Aviv, tel IDD-226, 2 November 1992, RG  25, Vol 27,639, File 
21-14-6-UNFICYP-1, LAC.
79 Permanent Mission New York to Ottawa, Cosics 1132, 5 November 1992, RG 25, 
Vol 27,639, File 21-14-6-UNFICYP-1, LAC.
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a s  M u lr o n e y ’s c h ie f  o f  s t a f f  fro m  1990 t o  19 9 2 , S p e c to r  e m p h a tic a lly  
re je c te d  th a t  o p tio n , in sis tin g  th a t  “ C a n a d a  m u st u p se t th e  s ta tu s  
q u o .” 80 M c D o u g a ll  a n d  h er c a b in e t c o lle a g u e s  n e e d e d  lit t le  co n v in c in g , 
a n d  in  D e c e m b e r  19 9 2 , sh e  f in a lly  a n n o u n c e d  t h a t  C a n a d a  w o u ld  lea v e  
C y p r u s  w ith in  a  y e a r.
M o s t  C a n a d ia n s  le ft C y p r u s  in  19 9 3 , th o u g h  fo rm e r F o re ig n  M in is te r  
J o e  C la r k  h u n g  on  a s  th e  s e c r e ta r y -g e n e r a l’s s p e c ia l re p re se n ta tiv e , 
a n d  a  s in g le  so ld ier s e r v e d  (a n d  c o n tin u e s  to  serve) w ith  u n f i c y p . 
T h a t  se e m s e n tire ly  a p p ro p ria te , a n d  p e rh a p s  re fle c ts  th e  d e ep  sen se  
o f  d u t y  th a t  h a s  a lw a y s  re s te d  c lo se  t o  th e  co re  o f  C a n a d a ’s C y p r u s  
c o m m itm e n t. A  re sp o n sib le  s e a rc h  for g lo b a l o rd er d r e w  C a n a d a  to  
th e  E a s t e r n  M e d ite rr a n e a n  in  19 6 4 , a n d  k e p t it th e re . T h r o u g h  fifty -  
n in e  tro o p  ro ta tio n s , 29,000 tro o p s , a n d  tw e n ty -e ig h t  k ille d , s u cce ssiv e  
C a n a d ia n  g o v e r n m e n ts  h e ld  firm  for t h ir t y  y e a r s . u n f i c y p  w a s  g o o d  
for C y p r u s , b u t it w a s  a ls o  g o o d  fo r C a n a d a ,  a d v a n c in g  its  n a t o  a n d  
u n  o b je c t iv e s , w h ile  re f le c t in g  le g it im a te  d o m e s tic  p o lit ic a l  in te r e s ts  
a n d  v a lu e s . W h e n  th is  b a la n c e  s h if t e d  w ith  th e  e n d  o f  th e  C o ld  W a r , 
C a n a d a ’s s ta k e  in  C y p r u s  d im in is h e d  s h a rp ly . T h is  w a s  n o t, a s  so m e  
h a v e  c o m p la in e d , e v id e n c e  t h a t  C a n a d ia n s  h a d  “ lo s t  o u r  p la c e  in  th e  
w o r ld ,” o r t h a t  C a n a d a  w a s  “ o u t o f  th e  g a m e .” 81 R a th e r , th e  C y p r u s  
e x p e r ie n c e  re m in d s  u s  t h a t  C a n a d ia n  p e a c e k e e p in g  d ip lo m a c y  
so  o fte n  co m b in e d  a n  id e a lis t  g r a s p  o f  th e  d e s ir a b le  w ith  a  re a lis t  
a p p r e c ia tio n  o f  th e  p o ss ib le .
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